

A Psychological Theory of Explainability

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The goal of eXplainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is to make AI decision understandable to humans.



MANY techniques to generate explanations



Analysis of the techniques



Validation of the techniques



How humans interpret the explanations given



Humans project their beliefs onto the Al; they interpret the explanation provided by comparing it to the explanations that they themselves would give.





Human interpretability

Machine faithfulness

Human interpretability

Explanation sparsity

Human inference

Machine faithfulness

Human interpretability

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Human inference

Explainee simulation

Psychological grounding



Example trial (Explanation condition)

Which category do you think the robot will classify the image as?



Toaster Quill Al to be explained: ResNet-50 trained on ImageNet

Explanation: Saliency maps generated from Bayesian Teaching

Task: predict AI classification

Example trial (Explanation condition)

Which category do you think the robot will classify the image as?

























TOaster Quill













Model prediction



Model prediction

Which category do you think the robot will classify the image as?





Toaster Quill



Results

Fidelity:

probability that participants correctly predict the AI classification

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LOO-CV MSE:

Leave-one-out cross validation: standard way to compare models with different parameterizations

Mean squared error: discrepancy between the participants response and model prediction

Does the likelihood matter?



Does the psychological space matter?

VS

Psychological distance based on **pixel-wise difference**

$$sim[\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}'] = |\mathbf{e} - \mathbf{e}'|_{\mathbf{f}}$$

L-1 model

Psychological distance based on **feature overlap**

$$sim[\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}] = \frac{\langle \mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e}' \rangle}{\|\mathbf{e}\|_2 \|\mathbf{e}'\|_2}$$

Full model

Does the generalization function matter?



Monotonic generalization

$$p(\mathbf{e} \mid c, \mathbf{x}) = \lambda \exp[-\lambda (1 - sim[\mathbf{e}, \mathbf{e'}])]$$



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- 7. The theory can predict human response across a wide range of stimuli, classes, and explanations.



Contributions

 \star Psychological theory of explainability

- Humans project their own belief onto the AI
- Effective explanations mitigate this belief projection
- Humans interpret a received explanation by comparing it to selfgenerated explanations
 - The comparison occurs in a suitable psychological space
 - The comparison is turned to a response follows Shepard's universal law of generalization